The New Zealand case law and Waitangi Tribunal jurisprudence have developed the meaning of consultation in the Treaty context. Recently, this has been informed by UNDRIP. Overall, New Zealand has always had substantive consultation obligations in certain circumstances but the duty has been interpreted too narrowly. Purely procedural consultation in some situations is insufficient to discharge the Crown's duty to actively protect Maori or to discharge their duty of partnership. The level of consultation required is directly correlated to the taonga (interest) at stake, and interests in land are sufficient to trigger a substantive duty. The fears espoused in the SOE case have impeded the development of a substantive duty; however, the Canadian duty to accommodate and their spectrum analysis (shared by the Waitangi Tribunal) demonstrates that fear of creating an onerous duty is inflated and consultation can be developed in a way that balances the partnership between Maori and the Crown, as well as allowing a duly elected government to govern as it sees fit.
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I Introduction
Consultation developed in the common law context where a state decision having general effect required the input of those affected before the decision-making process commenced.
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One purpose of consultation is to enhance the prospects of success of decisions subsequently made by having the affected parties engaged and invested in those decisions.
In New Zealand, it has been held that there is no absolute duty to consult, but where a duty arises consultation must be meaningful. However, what constitutes meaningful and the nature of the duty has been the subject of considerable debate. 2 In particular, this debate has been extensive in the context of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty), which continues to raise the question: what is required from consultation where the Treaty is concerned?
The Treaty obliges the Crown to consult with Maori on any matter that a responsible Treaty partner would do so, not just on major issues. 3 The courts have held, however, that the Treaty does not impose a greater degree of consultation than that prescribed by legislation. 4 Consequently, consultation with Maori is purely procedural. Procedural consultation does not require agreement, consent or veto rights that would characterise something akin to a substantive consultation obligation. However, this interpretation is a very narrow reading of New Zealand's consultation jurisprudence. A considered reading of the consultation case law demonstrates that courts envisage situations where consultation with Maori imposes substantive obligations on the Crown, not only procedural.
Although the courts have held that consultation is not a standalone Treaty principle, it is considered essential to the principle of partnership and to the commitment to an enduring The partnership can move beyond grievance to a relationship of mutual advantage in which, through joint and agreed action, both partners can end up better off than they were before they started.
Although full authority tino rangatiratanga is no longer practicable, lesser options may be.
These may include shared decision-making or, where shared decision-making is not possible, the ability for Maori to influence the decisions of others who affect their taonga. 6 Thus where taonga is at stake, procedural consultation is inadequate for discharging the Crown's duty of partnership. It requires something more.
Taonga in the form of Maori land is of particular significance because of its fundamental importance to the identity, and the cultural, social and economic well-being of tangata with consultation being interpreted narrowly. Narrowly means purely procedural, whereas broad interpretations would encompass substantive elements. This essay sets out where a substantive duty arises and the form it takes according to the interest at stake.
Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy
Affecting Maori Culture and Identity, Te Taumata Tuatahi (Wai 262, 2011) at 17 (emphasis added). 6 At 24.
II Whenua
Whenua is of fundamental importance to the identity, and the cultural, social and economic well-being of tangata whenua. 7 Land is described as "tūrangawaewae" -"a place to stand" -without which the strength of the people will be diminished. Maori saw themselves as users of the land rather than its owners. While their use must equate with ownership for the purposes of English law, they saw themselves not as owning the land but as being owned by it. They were born out of it, for the land was Papatuanuku, the mother earth who conceived the ancestors of the Maori people. Similarly, whenua, or land, meant also the placenta, and the people were the tangata whenua, which term captured their view that they came from the earth's womb. As users of the earth's resources rather than its owners, they were required to propitiate the earth's protective deities. This, coincidentally, placed a constraint on greed.
Attachment to the land was reinforced by the stories of the land, and by a preoccupation with the accounts of ancestors, whose admonitions and examples provided the basis for law and a fertile field for its development. As demonstrated to us in numerous sayings, tribal pride and landmarks were connected and, as with other tribal societies, tribe and tribal lands were sources of self-esteem. In all, the essential Maori value of land, as we see it, was that lands were associated with particular communities and, save for violence, could not pass outside the descent group. That land descends from ancestors is pivotal to understanding the Maori land-tenure system. Such was the association between land and particular kin groups that to prove an interest in land, in Maori law, people had only to say who they were. While that is not the legal position today, the ethic is still remembered and upheld on marae.
In the words of Moana Jackson: One cannot fully be tangata whenua without a whenua to be tangata upon, and one cannot be a tangata whenua exercising the mana and rangatira handed down by the tīpuna without the authority to determine what happens to and with the whenua.
The centrality of land emphasises the importance of imposing substantive obligations on the Crown where whenua or interests in whenua exist. Knowledge of this inherent importance is central to this essay, and it is knowledge the Crown also possesses.
III Consultation with Maori
A General Consultation Principles
The common law consultation principles for consultation generally were described by the which is likely to include the general common law principles of consultation. 16 Notably, none of these general principles have substantive components. They are purely procedural requirements.
B Consultation with Maori
The following sub-sections analyse a selection of appellate court decisions that have specifically examined the Crown's duties with respect to consulting with Maori. These cases are chosen on the basis that they consider consultation where the Treaty is concerned.
Land: New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (SOE case)
The leading authority on consultation with Maori is the SOE case. The Court of Appeal denied the existence of an absolute duty to consult with Maori in all circumstances as unworkable. 17 In fulfilling its duty to act reasonably and in good faith, the Crown is obliged to make informed decisions so that proper regard is had to the impact of the treaty.
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Informed decisions require the Crown to be sufficiently informed as to the relevant facts and law to be able to say it has had proper regard to the impact of the principles of the Treaty. Such situations will discharge the obligation to act reasonably and in good faith.
Richardson J stated:
19
In many cases where it seems there may be Treaty implications that responsibility to make informed decisions will require some consultation. In some cases extensive consultation and co-operation will be necessary.
Unfortunately, the Court did not define "cooperation". However, the dictionary defines it as "working together towards the same end" and "help someone or comply with their is determined according to the interest at stake: the stronger the claim and the more significant the interest at stake, the more onerous the duty, with full scale alienation of land being at the high end.
Importantly, although Treaty principles do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on a duly-elected Government to follow its chosen policy, it cannot choose any policy it wants. 27 In order to fulfil its duty of active protection it must have due regard to potential Treaty claims. Land should not be transferred unless the Crown can satisfy itself that a claim or grievance is not well founded or that satisfactory safeguards are provided. 28 In order to satisfy itself, this may require extensive consultation and co-operation. 29 The interest at stake in the SOE case was so significant (Maori land) that it was reasonable to restrict the Crown. The restriction included a substantive element to consultation (agreement on a procedure). This restriction demonstrates that substantive obligations may be required from the Crown in order to protect Maori interests and fulfil their duty of active protection. The outcome demonstrates that the granting of licences is an interest that the courts will interfere with, in order to protect them. Therefore, it is an interest that triggers the duty of active protection. The Court held that this situation required the Crown not to act until the interests had been determined or a scheme established to adequately protect those interests, which in the SOE case required agreement or comment from the New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC) on behalf of Maori. This supports the preliminary conclusion that consultation requires more than procedure and extends to requiring something akin to agreement or consensus.
Interests in land: Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General (Tainui)
Interests in land: New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (Forestry Assets)
In Forestry Assets, the Court made a number of important observations to support the proposition that the interest at stake may determine the action required by the Crown to fulfil its duty of active protection, including the nature of consultation. The Crown in this case proposed to sell forestry rights, but not the underlying ownership of the relevant land.
The NZMC claimed that this was inconsistent with the SOE case decision. The Court reiterated the concept of partnership, stating that the good faith owed to each other by the parties to the Treaty "must extend to consultation on truly major issues". Tainui, this would also require the Crown to cease activity until a system was in place to safeguard Maori interests, which in the former case required agreement on a procedure (substantive consultation obligations). Thus, the duty of active protection and to provide redress would require something more than procedural consultation in this case.
Other interests: Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation (Ngai Tahu)
In Ngai Tahu, the issue of when consultation is required and what form it would take was discussed further. The Court also made important points regarding statutory Treaty provisions and the principle of partnership. The case concerned commercial whale watching permits held by Ngai Tahu. The Director-General issued a further permit to a third party. Ngai Tahu challenged the permit on the basis that it was entitled on Treaty principles to a period of operation protected from competition, or that the Director-General required their consent before issuing new permits.
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The Court held that statutory provisions for giving effect to the principles of the Treaty should not be interpreted narrowly. 38 Despite that, the Court found that the interest at stake was not one that could be brought within the scope of the Treaty. This was because, however liberally Maori customary title and Treaty rights might be construed, tourism and whale-watching were remote from anything in fact contemplated by the original parties to the Treaty. 39 However, the Court highlighted that, whilst a whale-watching business was not taonga or the enjoyment of a fishery within the contemplation of the Treaty, the interest was so linked to taonga and fisheries that a reasonable Treaty partner would recognise that 37 Ngai Tahu, above n 3. 38 At 558. 39 At 559 and 560.
Treaty principles were relevant. 40 The Court concluded that such issues are not to be approached narrowly and that: 41 The Crown is not right in trying to limit those principles to consultation ... since ... it has been established that principles require active protection of Maori interests. To restrict this to consultation would be hollow.
On the particular facts of this case the Court further stated that: Note the Court's statement that some Maori interests required more than consultation, and that Ngai Tahu's interest required more than mere procedural consideration. The case law has evolved such that consultation obligations for the Crown are, in certain situations, not limited to procedural matters but extend into substantive issues, although not including a veto right.
This may reflect the situation envisaged in the SOE case that requires "extensive consultation and co-operation". Cooperation being analogous to working together toward 40 At 558. 41 At 544 and 560. 42 At 561 (emphasis added).
a common end, which is supported by Wellington Airport. There, the Court noted that consultation does not include negotiation to agreement but it is not uncommon for that to follow because of a tendency in consultation to seek consensus.
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This conclusion is consistent with the Court's comments in Tainui. The cautious wording in that decision reflects the obvious conflict between the duty of active protection and the right of a duly-elected government to govern as it sees fit in some cases. It appears the Court is suggesting that in such cases of conflict a balancing exercise may need to be undertaken; this would not entail full sale, nor would it entail a 50/50 split. Instead it would involve a compromise to be arrived at through consultation that, by the nature of its resolution, be substantive, not just procedural. In other words, such a situation may require substantive obligations in order to fulfil the duty of active protection.
Preliminary Conclusion
Overall, the consultation case law demonstrates that New Zealand has always had substantive consultation obligations but that the SOE case and subsequent cases have interpreted those obligations too narrowly. Statutory provisions for giving effect to the principles of the Treaty should not be interpreted narrowly; and the Crown should not try to limit the principles of the treaty to just consultation. 44 The principles require the active protection of Maori interests, and to restrict this to just procedural consultation would be hollow. 45 Although this duty is not absolute, the fears concerning its unworkability that were raised in the SOE case are misplaced because the case law itself demonstrates that, when consultation is triggered and what form that consultation may take (procedural or substantive), can be delineated. The delineation will be determined according to the interest at stake; the graver the interest, the greater the duty to actively protect Maori interests. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
The ICCPR is binding international law, and the UNDRIP provisions are probably intended to reflect art 19(2). This article is read very broadly, particularly in the environmental context. Such that the right to freedom of expression includes the right to have sufficient information and an opportunity to develop a view. 54 The right to sufficient information is at the heart of consultation because informed decisions require both parties to be fully informed.
The right to FPIC directly addresses the necessity to obtain informed consent before the approval of any project on indigenous land. 
IV The Duty to Accommodate
Internationally, Canada offers a useful comparison as it shares key legal concepts with New These are the interests that trigger a consultation duty. The extent of the interest determines the level of consultation required.
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Aboriginal title and aboriginal rights in Canada are not absolute. 73 In R v Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada held that although aboriginal rights are constitutionally protected, legislation and government action can infringe those rights where an infringement is justified. 74 The notion of justifiable infringement is guided by the fiduciary obligations owed by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples and the necessary application of the Honour of the Crown (to be discussed below). 75 Whether the infringement can be justified is where the duty to consult is crucial; thus consultation with aboriginal people must be the first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified (informed decision-making).
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Justifiable infringement was characterised further in the Supreme Court case of Delgamuukw v British Columbia. First, there must be a compelling and substantial legislative objective. 77 This was interpreted widely, with Lamer CJ classifying mining and general economic development as objectives that could justifiably infringe Aboriginal interests. 78 Secondly, there must be an assessment on whether the infringement is consistent with the Crown's special fiduciary relationship with Aboriginal peoples. 79 This assessment is particular to the specific "legal and factual context", 80 but the nature of the right determines the degree of scrutiny required. 81 Importantly, in all cases, there is a minimum standard of consultation with the affected group. 82 The circumstances dictate what level of consultation is required, such as the nature of the interest at stake. 83 Further, the nature of the interest may also trigger the duty to accommodate Aboriginal interests in respect of the infringing action. Where title is infringed, the economic aspect suggests that fair compensation will be required. 84 However, if the interest only extends to a right to use land or resources, the right to accommodation is lessened.
In Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) the Supreme Court upheld a duty to consult where yet-unclaimed Aboriginal rights or title were concerned. 85 The duty arose from the Honour of the Crown, as it was deemed that this should be applied generously.
The Honour of the Crown is an ancient common-law doctrine. Essentially it "requires servants of the Crown to conduct themselves with honour whenever acting on behalf of the Sovereign". 86 It encompasses ideas of fundamental justice. 87 In Haida Nation, it was held to arise "from the Crown's assertion of sovereignty over a First Nation people and de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in control of that people". 88 The Court recognised that sovereignty was not legitimately gained from First Nation occupants of the land but rather imposed. 89 The tension created by the assertion of the Crown's de facto sovereignty and the legitimate but undermined sovereignty of the First Nation people creates this special relationship which requires the Crown to act honourably towards the First Nation people. 90 This relationship acknowledges that, at the time of imposition of the Crown's law, the Crown had persuaded the indigenous peoples that it could be relied upon to protect their rights better than if they were left alone. 91 Thus, the doctrine recognises the presence of the First Nation people, the injustice of the superimposition of the Crown's laws on those people and the impacts that unfamiliar legal system had on them.
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In the SOE case the Court stated that the Treaty obliges the Crown to recognise the interests therein as well as actively protect them, 93 and the principle of active protection is inherent in the concept of an on-going partnership founded on the Treaty. 94 The Court considered these principles (active protection and partnership) to be an articulation of the Honour of the Crown, which they stated underlies all treaty relationships. 95 The statement in the SOE case that the doctrine is reflected in the Treaty principles highlights the validity of looking at the Canadian jurisprudence when interpreting the Treaty. Further, Cooke P, in a later case considered the principles of partnership and fiduciary analogies to be consistent with the Canadian law. 96 He stated that in interpreting legislation and common law, the New Zealand courts must "lean against any inference that in this democracy the rights of the Maori people are to be less respected than the rights of aboriginal peoples are in North Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect them.
The determination of such a duty depends both on the strength of the right that is being encroached upon as well as the negative impact and gravity of the government's conduct. When the Crown has actual or constructive knowledge of the existence, or potential existence, of an Aboriginal right, and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it, the Honour of the Crown gives rise to a duty to consult.
The Court also discussed the scope and content of the duty to consult and accommodate stating that generally, the scope of the duty is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed. 102 In most cases, (the duty) will be significantly deeper than mere consultation, with some cases requiring the full consent of an Aboriginal nation. 103 These sentiments reflect some of the discussion in the SOE case; however, the Court in Haida Nation very clearly sets out the parameters of the duty.
Haida Nation also provides a useful comparator with the New Zealand Forestry Assets case since both cases concerned unclaimed interests and forestry licences. In Haida Nation the granting of a forestry license was held to trigger a duty to consult and accommodate The Tribunal considered that this claim was "at the high end of the spectrum for consultation and cooperation" given the subject matter of the Maori Community Development Act and the surrounding policy. 114 As such, the Crown is on notice to actively The Treaty envisaged a place in New Zealand for two peoples with their own laws and customs, in which the interface was governed by partnership and mutual respect. Inherent in the Treaty relationship was that Maori, whose laws and autonomy were guaranteed and protected, would have options when settlement and the new society developed. They could choose to continue their tikanga and way of life largely as it was, to assimilate to the new society and economy, or to combine elements of both and walk in two worlds. Their choices were to be free and unconstrained.
The discussions in Wai 262 and the Maori Community Development Act Claim support that the nature of the interest will determine the level of consultation. The Canadian courts use the word spectrum, while the Wai 262 Tribunal called it a sliding scale. Thus the more significant the interest, the more that is required from consultation. This idea was further developed and subsequently applied to legislation dealing with land in the Te Ture Whenua
Maori Act Reform Claim. In that claim the Tribunal concluded that the taonga was so significant in that case (Maori land) that the Maori interest was so central and so compelling that the Crown required fully informed broad based consent from Maori to proceed with the reforms; consultation extended to requiring full, free and informed consent.
124
VI Conclusion
The 
